

#### Game-Theoretical Semantics for First Order Logic

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## Background

- GTS was first introduced formally in the 1950s by Paul Lorenzen.
- The idea was, however, mentioned already in 1890s by C. S. Peirce.
- Nowadays GTS is being developed mainly by Jaakko Hintikka.
- Hintikka proposes that GTS is a "better" semantics for FOL than Tarski's model-theoretic one.
- But even if one doesn't want to go *that* far, there are still some interesting notions in GTS.



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## **Basic Idea**

- Truth of a FOL sentence is determined by a play of "logic game" between two players.
- It is a simple perfect-information, zero-sum game.
- Traditionally, those players are called *Abelard* and *Eloise*.
- Sentence is true if Eloise wins.
- Sentence is false if Abelard wins.



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#### The Game - extensional view

- *Game* is a tuple  $(P_A, P_E, M_A, M_E, W_A, W_E)$ , where:
  - $P_A$  and  $P_E$  are non-empty, disjoint sets of positions,
  - $M_A$  and  $M_E$  are sets of moves
  - $W_A$  and  $W_E$  are sets of winning positions.
- $M_A \subseteq (P_A \setminus (W_A \cup W_E)) \times (P_A \cup P_E)$
- $M_E \subseteq (P_E \setminus (W_A \cup W_E)) \times (P_A \cup P_E)$
- *Play* is a *maximal* sequence of positions  $s_0, \ldots, s_n, \ldots$  such that  $\forall_i(s_i, s_{i+1}) \in M_A \cup M_E$



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## The Rules - intensional view

- Players make moves depending on the shape of the target sentence S:
  - if  $S = P \lor Q$  then Eloise chooses one of  $\{P, Q\}$  as a new target sentence.
  - if  $S = P \land Q$  then Abelard chooses one of  $\{P, Q\}$  as a new target sentence.
  - if  $S = \exists_x P$  then Eloise chooses a value which is substituted for x in the sentence P.
  - if  $S = \forall_x P$  then Abelard chooses a value which is substituted for x in the sentence P.
  - if  $S = \neg P$  then the players swap roles and the game goes on with P as target sentence.

## Winning Strategy

- To repeat: sentence is true iff Eloise wins and false iff Abelard wins.
- Before semantic games can be used as a definition of semantics for FOL, some of their properties need to be established.
- The games, as defined before, are:
  - Total there is no draw.
  - Determined there exists a winning strategy.
- Those are basic results from game theory for perfect-information, zero-sum games.

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## **Equivalence of Semantics**

- Due to the existence of winning strategies, every logic sentence is either true or false.
- It can be proven (by induction on complexity of formula) that the game-theoretical semantics is equivalent to Tarski's model-theoretic semantics.
- The proof requires Axiom of Choice for formulas in the form  $\forall_x \varphi(x)$ .
- This requirement is due to the desire to have explicit winning strategies.



#### **Game – Once More**

- Logic games corresponding to FOL have several additional interesting features.
- They are *well-founded*.
- Any particular game is of *finite-length*.
- Strategies are Markov processes.

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## Motivation

- Game-Theoretical semantics can be more natural for some domains than Tarski's model-theoretic semantics.
- Semantics is fully independent on syntax of the language.
- It allows for many interesting extensions.
- There supposedly are philosophical and linguistics advantages of GTS over other semantics.





- **Indeterminable Sentences** 
  - The game-theoretical semantics can be naturally extended to include the notion of indeterminable sentences.
- Actually, there is more than one such notion:
  - Unknown truth value if, instead of saying "exists winning strategy" we say "winning strategy is known".
  - 2. No truth value if we modify rules of the games in such a way that winning strategy does not exist.



## **Multi-Valued Logics**

- Three valued logic mentioned above.
- To go further, a *score* in single play can be any value, not just *win* or *lose*.
- This leads to multi-valued logics, all the way up to continuous-valued ones.
- A different approach would be to consider multiple-player games.
- Thus, "truth values" doesn't have to correspond to numbers, they can represent more complicated structures.

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#### **Infinite Sentences**

• Consider a sentence:

 $\forall x_0 \exists x_1 \forall x_2 \exists x_3 \dots R(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3 \dots)$ 

- Tarski's model-theoretic semantics doesn't provide any meaning for this kind of sentence.
- Game-Theoretical semantics doesn't have any problems here.
- However, games defined by such formulae are *not* necessarily well-founded.
- Therefore, they can be non-determined, i.e. some sentences do not have any truth value.

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## **Many-Sorted Logics**

- Different variables have different domains.
- Game-Theoretical semantics can be easily extended to deal with this kind of logic.
- Modify rules concerning quantifiers in such a way that a player who chooses value from outside variable's domain loses immediately.



#### Modal Logics

- Consider a set W of worlds and an accessibility relation  $R \subseteq W \times W$ .
- The game takes place in chosen world  $w \in W$ .
- Extend the FOL language syntax with two modalities {◊, □} and the game with following rules:
  - if  $S = \Diamond P$  then Eloise chooses a world w'such that R(w, w') and game proceeds with Pin world w'.
  - if  $S = \Box P$  then Abelard chooses a world w' such that R(w, w') and game proceeds with P in world w'.

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#### **Modal Logics, continued**

- Such a game is determined.
- Not surprisingly, semantics described by this game is equivalent to Kripke possible worlds semantics.
- It can also be easily extended to the case of more than one modality type and combined with other extensions.



## **Other Logical Games**

- Back-and-Forth Games Samson and Delilah (or Spoiler and Duplicator) play a game to determine whether two structures are *elementarily equivalent* (Tarski, 1946).
- Forcing games a way of building infinite structures with controlled properties. Eloise and Abelard play to build an infinite formula consistent with chosen axioms.
- Cut-and-choose games given a collection of objects A and set of properties S, Eloise and Abelard play to establish the rank of (A, S) also called Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension.

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#### The idea

- Extend expressiveness of FOL *without* explicit use of second-order quantifiers.
- Introduce limited notion of imperfect knowledge into the semantic game.
- The IFL approach provides and defines the idea of *informational independence* among quantifiers and logical connectives.
- IFL can be used to model concurrency, limited (memory) resources, information flow, restricted trust, etc.

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# **Henkin Quantifier** LUND Non-linear ordering of quantifiers (1961): UNIVERSITY $\begin{array}{ccc} \forall_x & \exists_y \\ \forall_z & \exists_u \end{array} \end{array} R(x, y, z, u)$ Can be easily expressed in Second Order Logic using Skolem functions: $\mathbf{H}R(x, y, z, u) \Leftrightarrow$ $\exists f_1 \exists f_2 \forall_x \forall_z R(x, f_1(x), z, f_2(z))$



#### Henkin Quantifier, continued

- Is more expressive than First Order Logic, though.
- Henkin Quantifier can be used to express, for example, Mostowski's generalized quantifier  $Q_0$ :



There exist infinitely many elements such that ...



#### **Information Independence** LUND IFL uses slightly more general notation: UNIVERSITY $\mathbf{H}R(x, y, z, u) \Leftrightarrow$ $\forall_x \exists_y \forall_{(z/x,y)} \exists_{(u/x,y)} R(x,y,z,u)$ • $\exists_{(x/y)}$ means "exists x independent of y". • $\forall_{(x/y)}$ means "for all x independent of y". • $P \lor_{(x)} Q$ means "P or Q, independly of x". • $P \wedge_{(x)} Q$ means "P and Q, independly of x".

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#### Imperfect Knowledge Game

- Semantic for IFL is given by *imperfect knowledge* game.
- This game is *not* determined.
- It is, however, well-founded and (for any given formula) finite-length game.
- Strategies in this game need to reflex the imperfect information.
- One way of modeling this requirement is by sets of indistinguishable states *I*.
- A player needs to choose *the same* actions for every state in  $I_i$ .

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## True, False, Indeterminable

- An IFL formula is true iff Eloise has a winning strategy.
- An IFL formula is false iff Abelard has a winning strategy.
- An IFL formula is indeterminable iff neither of the players have a winning strategy.
- Example:  $\forall_x \exists_{(y/x)} x \neq y$ .





## Signaling

- Example:  $\forall_x \exists_z \exists_{(y/x)} x \neq y$ .
- Interesting, isn't it?
- One way of looking at it is to consider Eloise to be, in fact, a *team* of players.
- One player from the team is aware of Abelard's choice for x, but cannot "directly" influence y.
- Another player can decide up value of y, but is not aware of Abelard's choice for x.

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#### **Beyond-FOL expressiveness**

- IF logic is strictly more expressive than FOL.
- IF logic is no more expressive than complete Second Order Logic:
  - Every independence between quantifiers can be easily modeled as a Skolem function.
  - In a similar manner, we can define a function to *choose* one element from each logical connective independly of some variables.



## Second Order Logic

- A monadic logic is one in which quantifiers only range over sets.
- Let us consider formulae in the form:  $Q_1 \dots Q_n \varphi$ , where  $Q_i$  are blocks of quantifiers and  $Q_i$  is existential iff  $Q_{i+1}$  is universal.
- Some examples:
  - $\Sigma_n^1$  logic is a class of formulae equivalent to the above when the first block is *existential*.
  - $\Pi_n^1$  logic is a class of formulae equivalent to the above when the first block is *universal*.
  - $\Delta_1^1 = \Sigma_1^1 \cap \Pi_1^1$

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 $\Sigma_1^1$  logic

- $\Sigma_1^1$  logic is monadic existential second order logic.
- That is, a second order logic in which only existential quantifiers are allowed, and where quantifiers can only range over sets.
- The expressive powers of IFL and Σ<sub>1</sub><sup>1</sup> coincide,
  i.e. for every formula in one of them there exists an equivalent formula in the other.

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## IF Modal Logic

- Propositional version.
- A *k*-ary modal structure  $\mathbb{M} = (D, \mathbb{P}, R_0, \dots, R_{k-1}, \mathfrak{h})$ , where:
  - *D* is the domain (set of worlds);
  - $\mathbb{P}$  is the set of propositional atoms;
  - $R_i$  are accessibility relations for modalities, defined over  $D \times D$ .
  - h is an interpretation relation, assigning subset of propositions to each domain element.



#### **IFML Semantics**

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- Game  $G(\varphi, \mathbb{M}, d)$  is defined by the following rules:
- If  $\varphi \in \{p, \neg p\}$ , for  $p \in \mathbb{P}$ , then no move is made and:
  - Eloise wins if
    - $$\begin{split} \varphi &= p \quad \wedge \quad d \in \mathfrak{h}(p), \text{ or} \\ \varphi &= \neg p \quad \wedge \quad d \notin \mathfrak{h}(p) \end{split}$$
  - Otherwise Abelard wins.
- If  $\varphi = \theta \lor \psi$  then Eloise picks a disjunct.
- If  $\varphi = \theta \wedge \psi$  then Abelard picks a conjunct.

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#### **IFML Semantics, continued**

- Let i < k
- If  $\varphi = \Box_i \psi$  then Abelard picks out a state d' such that  $R_i(d, d')$  and the game continues as  $G(\psi, \mathbb{M}, d')$
- If such choice is impossible, Eloise wins.
- If  $\varphi = \Diamond_i \psi$  then Eloise picks out a state d' such that  $R_i(d, d')$  and the game continues as  $G(\psi, \mathbb{M}, d')$
- If such choice is impossible, Abelard wins.



## Conclusions

- Natural semantics for many applications, for example for Model Checking.
- Express formally interactive computational tasks.
- Computability Logic.
- Systems involving planning and re-planning.

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